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Introduction
On August 8, 2017, North Korea threatened the U.S. territory of Guam with a “ring of fire.” On
September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted an underground test of a high-yield nuclear device
claimed to be a hydrogen bomb. This device, if weaponized, could be carried on an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—such as the missile tested on July 18, 2017—and
detonated at high altitude to execute an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. On September 3,
coincident with its bomb test, North Korea declared a “super-powerful EMP attack” capability
to be a “strategic goal.” On September 22, 2017, Ri Yong Ho, Foreign Minister of North Korea,
spoke of a potential atmospheric nuclear test. On October 13, 2017, North Korea state media
published a threat to “take counteractions for self-defense, including a salvo of missiles into
waters near the US territory of Guam.”1 In a CNN interview aired on October 25, 2015, a senior
North Korean official repeated a threat of an atmospheric nuclear test.2 We expect this pattern
of North Korean threats to continue.
On September 20, 2017, U.S. Air Force General John E. Hyten validated in public that EMP
attack is “a very dangerous threat.” As commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Hyten
has the responsibility for assuring the viability of America’s nuclear deterrent. General Hyten
also stated, “Our nation as a whole has not looked at EMP, we have not looked at the critical
infrastructure that could be damaged by EMP, and we need to take a step back and look at that
entire threat because it is a realistic threat.”3
The Congressional EMP Commission likewise concluded in 2004 that EMP is “one of a small
number of threats that has the potential to hold our society at risk and might result in defeat of
our military forces.”4 In short, multiple credible authorities have concluded that EMP attack by
North Korea poses an existential threat to America.
In this working paper, we provide a brief appraisal of the nature of the EMP effects and how
technical experts might proactively prepare for atmospheric nuclear tests. To aid government
policymakers, we consider five atmospheric test scenarios conducted via ballistic missile that
North Korea might pursue, taking into account potential trajectories, detonation altitudes, and
impacts on humans and critical infrastructure.
We found that all atmospheric nuclear test options in the Pacific cause significant risk for both
humans and critical infrastructure.
We urge the U.S. Government to immediately prepare for North Korean atmospheric nuclear
tests. Moreover, the U.S. Government should rapidly assess the implications of such tests if
they occur―and prepare in advance appropriate diplomatic, political, military, and technical
responses.
Optimistically, U.S. actions, diplomatic and otherwise, will forestall such atmospheric tests.
Nonetheless, the United States, in concert with its allies, should proactively install EMP
instrumentation and recording devices in the Pacific region.
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Executive Summary
On September 3, 2017, the Korean Central News Agency of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea stated that the capability to conduct high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack is
a strategic goal of the regime. On September 22, 2017, the North Korean foreign minister
remarked to reporters in New York that his country may conduct an atmospheric hydrogen
bomb test above the Pacific Ocean. Multiple commentators have speculated that a North
Korean atmospheric test in the Pacific could have the purpose of demonstrating an EMP attack
capability.5 6
In order to deter attack or regime change, North Korea must threaten severe consequences on
the United States. The former technical director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, George W.
Ullrich, has stated, “The single, most effective use of a nuclear weapon by a Third World
country would be a high-altitude detonation to debilitate sophisticated electronics
technologies…”7 High-altitude EMP may ultimately be North Korea’s strongest deterrent,
holding the American population under threat of sustained and widespread disruption of U.S.
critical infrastructure with only a small number of nuclear weapons. However, because EMP
tests by the U.S. and Soviet Union five decades ago were inadequately instrumented by current
day standards, and because the limited test results have been withheld as classified
information, North Korea currently lacks technical data to definitively make an EMP attack on
the United States a credible threat.
Authoritative sources such as the congressionally authorized Commission to Assess the Threat
to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack (“Congressional EMP
Commission”) have concluded that EMP is a severe and even existential threat to America.
Nonetheless, other analysts routinely discount the EMP threat, undermining its deterrent value
to North Korea.8 An atmospheric test of EMP could end this debate by demonstrating
widespread debilitation of modern infrastructures dependent on miniaturized electronics,
undersea telecommunication cables, space satellites, and associated ground stations.
The Foundation for Resilient Societies has postulated a variety of scenarios for both highaltitude EMP tests and low-altitude non-EMP nuclear tests to aid in determining potentially
advantageous locations for pre-positioning instrumentation. We took into consideration
potential missile trajectories, detonation altitudes, and impacts on critical infrastructure and
human populations. We found that the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean provide a wide range
of test options, but that all possible trajectories and detonation altitudes pose significant risks
to human populations and critical infrastructures.
Based on our assessment, we recommend that the U.S. Government move quickly to preposition measurement instruments at several locations. The large geographic footprint of EMP
effects—up to 5,000 kilometers across— reduces the number of needed instrumentation
locations and greatly increases the likelihood of data capture. Data collected from any EMP
tests would increase scientific understanding of these phenomena, aid public and private sector
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investments in critical infrastructure protection, inform strategic responses, and provide
insights respecting North Korean nuclear weapons designs.
Some candidate locations for North Korea EMP tests in the Pacific Ocean might result in
disrupted global trade, impaired intercontinental communications, and damage to critical
infrastructures in Hawaii and other U.S territories, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and other
nations. Accordingly, through concerted regional diplomacy, the U.S. should redouble efforts to
discourage high-altitude EMP testing that can be anticipated to harm many nations. In parallel,
the United States should prepare for “anticipatory self-defense” campaigns, including attempts
to prevent launches―and to enable ballistic missile interceptions were launches to occur.9

North Korean Statements and Actions on Nuclear Program Goals
On August 8, 2017, in an official statement, North Korea threated the U.S. territory of Guam:10
The KPA Strategic Force is now carefully examining the operational plan for making an
enveloping fire at the areas around Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic
rocket Hwasong-12 in order to contain the U.S. major military bases on Guam including
the Anderson Air Force Base in which the U.S. strategic bombers, which get on the nerves
of the DPRK and threaten and blackmail it through their frequent visits to the sky above
south Korea, are stationed and to send a serious warning signal to the U.S.
On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted an underground test of a high-yield nuclear
weapon. Seismic readings indicated that the yield was consistent with a small hydrogen bomb
or boosted fission device.11 In an official statement, North Korea claimed that a hydrogen bomb
had been tested:12
Scientists in the nuclear field of the DPRK successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for
ICBM in the northern nuclear test ground of the DPRK at 12:00 on September 3, true to
the Workers’ Party of Korea’s plan for building a strategic nuclear force.
Just hours before the September 3, 2017 bomb test, the Korean Central News Agency released
a statement with the headline “North Korean leader Kim Jong-un gives guidance to nuclear
weaponization of ICBM.” Communist party Chair Kim Jong-un declared EMP attack capability is
a strategic goal of his regime:13
The H-bomb, the explosive power of which is adjustable from tens kiloton to hundreds
kiloton, is a multi-functional thermonuclear nuke with great destructive power which can
be detonated even at high altitudes for super-powerful EMP attack according to
strategic goals.
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On September 19, 2017, President Donald Trump made a speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, saying:14
North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the
entire world with unthinkable loss of human life…The United States has great strength
and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to
totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his
regime.
In response to President Trump’s United Nations speech, Kim Jong-un made a televised
statement on September 22, 2017:15
Now that Trump has denied the existence of and insulted me and my country in front of
the eyes of the world and made the most ferocious declaration of war in history that he
would destroy the DPRK, we will consider with seriousness taking a corresponding,
highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history.
Only hours after Kim Jong-un’s September 22, 2017 threat against the U.S., Ri Yong Ho, Foreign
Minister of North Korea, spoke to reporters in New York, stating: 16
In my opinion, perhaps we might consider a historic aboveground test of a hydrogen
bomb over the Pacific Ocean.
On October 13, 2017, North Korean state media published a renewed threat to launch missiles
on a trajectory terminating near the U.S. territory of Guam. The media release quoted Kim
Kwang Hak, a researcher at the Institute for American Studies of the North Korean Foreign
Ministry:17
We have already warned several times that we will take counteractions for self-defense,
including a salvo of missiles into waters near the US territory of Guam…the US military
action hardens our determination that the US should be tamed with fire and lets us take
our hand closer to the 'trigger' for taking the toughest countermeasure.
On Wednesday, October 25, 2017, a senior North Korean official, Ri Yong Pil, repeated foreign
minister Ri Yong Ho’s threat of an atmospheric nuclear test:18
The foreign minister is very well aware of the intentions of our supreme leader, so I think
you should take his words literally.

Electromagnetic Pulse Capability as a “Strategic Goal”
North Korea has declared “super-powerful EMP attack” capability as a “strategic goal” of its
nuclear weapons program. To conduct a high-altitude EMP attack, a nuclear weapon is
detonated at an altitude of approximately 40 kilometers to 400 kilometers. Ionizing radiation
from the detonation interacts with the earth’s magnetic field and electrons in the thin
atmosphere to produce a series of electromagnetic pulses radiating downward within line-of-
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sight of the burst. The first pulse (E1) can debilitate electrical and electronic equipment.
Electronic communication and control equipment is particularly vulnerable, precipitating failure
of critical infrastructure including the electric grid, telecommunications, the Internet,
transportation, oil and chemical refineries, drinking water supplies, sewage pumping and
treatment, banking and finance, and a host of other critical infrastructures. A subsequent pulse
(E3) can damage or destroy high-voltage transformers essential for long-distance transmission
of electricity and also debilitate both land and undersea telecommunications systems. For a
detonation at 40 kilometers altitude, the diameter of the line-of-sight area on the ground is
approximately 1,400 kilometers. For a detonation at 400 kilometers altitude, the diameter of
the line-of sight-area on the ground is approximately 4,400 kilometers.
Why would EMP be a preferred means of nuclear attack by North Korea, a higher strategic
priority than ground-level attack causing shock, blast, fallout, and ground-level radiation? We
propose that the North Korean incentives fall into three basic categories. First, to achieve an
EMP attack capability, North Korea would have fewer technical obstacles than for ground-level
attack. Second, a high-altitude burst EMP attack is wide-area threat—with one or a few nuclear
warheads mounted on missiles for EMP attack, North Korea can credibly threaten the vast
majority of U.S. infrastructure, whereas a surface-burst attack on a few cities would not have
the same widespread impact. Third, an EMP attack will not directly cause human fatalities,
although wide-area critical infrastructure failure in the aftermath will certainly result in
economic disruption and long-term loss of life. However, without immediate loss of life, the
international community may lack consensus that an EMP attack justifies retaliation using
nuclear weapons, perhaps decreasing the risk of escalation.

Achieving Electromagnetic Pulse Attack Capability
The technical pathway to achieving a high-altitude EMP attack has far fewer obstacles than a
ground-level blast and shock attack. Fundamentally, lightweight EMP devices, with a much
wider area of impact, are easier to deliver than higher yield weapons designed to produce
localized ground-level damage.
For ground-level attack, the warhead must be delivered over a long distance, necessitating a
fleet of long-range bombers (including aircraft carriers and/or air refueling capability),
submarines or ships capable of crossing oceans undetected, or intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) with inertial guidance systems. If ICBMs are to be the delivery mechanism, the warhead
must survive the heat and vibration of reentry. Ground-level blast and shock effects vary with
the cube root of the yield of the warhead. Effective ground-level attack with small warheads
requires accurate delivery or the use of multiple reentry vehicles.
The technical requirements to execute an EMP attack are more easily surmounted. The
warhead must be lofted to an altitude of at least 40 kilometers; this altitude can be attained
with a crude missile launched from a ship or submarine. An accurate inertial guidance system is
not required—detonation dozens or even hundreds of kilometers off-course will still cause EMP

5

High Consequence Scenarios for North Korean Atmospheric Tests
over a wide area—the line-of-sight effects coverage has diameter hundreds or even thousands
of kilometers across. EMP detonation at altitude 100 kilometers or greater avoids the
challenges of designing a reentry vehicle. Detonation over the ocean, well outside national
borders, can expose areas hundreds of miles inland.
EMP effects do not vary proportionately with yield of the warhead—a low-yield device
detonated at an optimal altitude can produce EMP effects of approximately the same
magnitude as a high-yield device. While nuclear blast and shock effects diminish rapidly with
distance from the detonation, the most-damaging EMP effects are remarkably uniform within
line-of-sight of the detonation. Because only a small amount of the energy released by the
detonation is needed to produce EMP effects, there is opportunity to design and test small lowyield, high-efficiency EMP weapons—or “super-powerful EMP” devices in the parlance of North
Korea.

Electromagnetic Pulse as an Asymmetric Threat to Large Nations
Large, industrialized nations such as the United States are dependent on critical infrastructure
such as electric grids, telecommunication networks, and computer-controlled water treatment
systems for daily survival. All critical infrastructures depend on electric grids. Electric grids, in
turn, depend on microprocessor-based control systems that are highly vulnerable to
electromagnetic pulse. Hard-to-replace high voltage transformers are another key EMP
vulnerability of electric grids.19
The Congressional EMP Commission concluded:20
The high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is one of a
small number of threats that has the potential to hold our society seriously at risk and
might result in defeat of our military forces.
More recently, on September 20, 2017, General John E. Hyten, the commander of United States
Strategic Command, addressed the EMP threat in public remarks to the 2017 Air Force
Association conference:21
An EMP is a very dangerous threat and it’s a realistic threat. It’s something that would
basically―if you’re not nuclear hardened―it will basically shut down any digital
computer that is operating in the range of the EMP…The most likely way to create EMP
is with a nuclear weapon and you don’t actually have to kill anyone directly with a
nuclear weapon to create that horrible EMP pulse.
Without functioning electric grids, and the functioning of dependent infrastructures,
industrialized nations cannot support their dense, urbanized populations. It is not an
overstatement to say that an effectively executed electromagnetic pulse attack could be
existential threat to a large nation.
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In contrast, North Korea is far less dependent on its electric grid and other modern
infrastructure, as this NASA nighttime photograph of the Korean Peninsula shows:

Figure 1. NASA Photograph of Korean Peninsula at Night in 2014
Therefore, it is not surprising that the small nation of North Korea has ambitions to exploit EMP
as an asymmetric threat against the much larger and more industrialized U.S.

International Perceptions of Electromagnetic Pulse Attack
Because an EMP attack would be against critical infrastructure, and would only indirectly cause
human casualties, near-term international consensus that retaliation with nuclear weapons is
justified may not exist. The technical phenomena of EMP can be unfamiliar to heads of state
and their diplomats, while all nations understand the effects of ground-level nuclear attack on
human populations. Were an EMP attack to be launched from a ship or submarine, the source
of the attack might not be immediately traceable.22 The impact zone for EMP is large—up to
5,000 kilometers across. The wide-area effect of EMP would allow an attacker to detonate EMP
devices above international waters and still expose large inland geographies, causing massive
debilitation of land-based infrastructure.
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The International Legal Regime: Atmospheric Testing Opportunities
Treaties Restricting Atmospheric Nuclear Tests
The legal regime affecting high-altitude testing of nuclear weapons by North Korea is
unfavorable, but probably not sufficient in itself to deter North Korean atmospheric testing. An
international consensus developed during the atmospheric testing in the 1950s and early
1960s, resulting in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963.a The LTBT treaty allows testing
underground, but not in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. North Korea is not a
party to this treaty. Other nations have refrained from joining this treaty and later tested in the
atmosphere, without direct military response against these nuclear testing nations.
North Korea is, however, a state party to the Environmental Modification Convention of 1977
(“the ENMOD”), which entered into force in October 1978. The ENMOD treaty limits purposeful
manipulation of the earth’s environment that causes widespread, severe, or long-lasting harm
to other state parties. An EMP-enhanced nuclear weapon or multiple weapons detonated in the
upper atmosphere could cause widespread, severe, or long-lasting harm to critical
infrastructures, through the electromagnetic modification of the earth’s environment. Such
intentional action could be a “material breach” of the ENMOD Convention.
Because this Convention directs initiatives for remedial action to the U.N. Security Council, an
imprudent design feature of the treaty,23 North Korea might seek shelter from China, Russia, or
both―each a permanent member with veto power in the Security Council. Even were a veto to
be exercised to shield North Korea from enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, member states suffering damage to critical infrastructure and possibly
extensive loss of life could invoke their superior rights under Article 103 of the Charter to
exercise mutual obligations for self-defense under Article 51.24
Moreover, technical constraints in the design of the high-altitude EMP event or events might
reduce the geographic reach or the prompt damage from a high-altitude EMP attack, so that
apologists for North Korean misconduct might argue that sanctions should not be extended
beyond those already imposed by the United Nations in September 2017.

Testing Opportunities Nearby North Korea
North Korea may consider detonating an atmospheric hydrogen bomb test in the Sea of Japan,
within its Pyongyang (ZKKP) Flight Information Region (FIR).25 The Pyongyang FIR was
established by international agreement through the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) of the United Nations. This FIR and the region immediately to its east has been a
common testing ground for unarmed missiles, despite danger to aircraft transiting commonly
traveled airline routes.

a

See the Treaty Documents and UN Resolutions section of this paper for a click-through hyperlink to the text, list
of signatory states, and state parties for treaties.
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Most nations that have tested nuclear weapons above the land or ocean surfaces have done so
within their national territory, within colonies, or within trust territories under their jurisdiction.
North Korea has no such proprietary test regions. One alternative that North Korea might
consider is a test within their restricted air defense zone and/or Pyongyang FIR in the Sea of
Japan, eastward of North Korea as shown in Figure 2 below.
We consider an atmospheric nuclear test by North Korea in the Sea of Japan to be possible, but
unlikely. An atmospheric test in the Sea of Japan without Notices to Airmen and Notices to
Mariners would be an extremely provocative act. However, if North Korea were to provide
proper notice of a test, there is the risk that a missile delivery system would be shot down by
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in South Korea or Aegis ballistic missile
systems onboard U.S. Navy ships. Likewise, aircraft or ships used as delivery systems by North
Korea could be intercepted.
For the line-of-sight of the nuclear fireball to stay within the area of the Pyongyang FIR shown
in Figure 2 below, the test would require an altitude limitation of approximately 1 kilometer.a
Such a choice would preclude North Korea from demonstrating a high-altitude EMP weapon
and from assessing electromagnetic effects (E1, E2, and E3) of such a weapon. To test even
minimal E1 and E3 effects, it would be necessary for North Korea to detonate a device at an
altitude of at least 40 kilometers—and EMP effects would undoubtedly spill over the territory
of other nations.26
Policymakers should take note that North Korea has threatened missile launches terminating in
the Pacific Ocean near Guam and also threatened an atmospheric nuclear test ― these
statements are consistent with intent to conduct a high-altitude EMP test. If North Korea’s
objective is to demonstrate high-altitude “super EMP” capability, as previously stated by Party
officials, such a test cannot occur in the Sea of Japan without significant damage to
infrastructure of other countries. Any test in the Sea of Japan capable of producing highaltitude EMP effects would damage land based critical infrastructure in Vladivostok, portions of
China, much of South Korea and Japan, as well as North Korea itself.

a

We recognize that within “line-of-sight” of the detonation point is a somewhat arbitrary benchmark for direct
nuclear effects, including visual impacts. However, we employ this measure for an atmospheric nuclear test within
the Pyongyang FIR to show that the FIR region is so small that tests without impact to other nations would be
extremely difficult.
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Image Source: ICAO map annotated by Foundation for Resilient Societies to show potential test site and line-of-sight radii
Figure 2. Potential Atmospheric Test Site in Sea of Japan within Pyongyang (ZKKP) Flight Information Region
The line-of-sight from a detonation at one kilometer burst height could be contained within North Korean airspace, as shown by the
green circle in Figure 2. However, lower-altitude bursts to demonstrate non-EMP aspects of a weapon, such as definitive hydrogen
bomb capability, miniaturization and pairing with a missile, or reentry capabilities, also entail substantial risk. The fireball from a
surface burst or very low-altitude airburst would reach the ocean, causing severe localized fallout that would spread in a direction
determined by prevailing winds. The black dashed line in Figure 2 shows the line-of-sight extent of an atmospheric test at an altitude
of 40 kilometers; the electromagnetic pulse from such a test would reach South Korea, China, Japan, and Vladivostok, Russia.
10

High Consequence Scenarios for North Korean Atmospheric Tests

Testing Opportunities in the South Pacific
North Korea is not a state party to the Treaty of Rarotonga, by which South Pacific nations and
others agree to refrain from nuclear testing in that region. Due to a South Pacific-wide treaty to
prohibit atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, North Korea might conclude it was prudent to
exclude the French Polynesian or other South Pacific regions from options for high-altitude
nuclear testing areas.27

Potential Financial Liabilities from Atmospheric Nuclear Tests
Beyond military or sanctions vulnerabilities, would the government of North Korea be
financially liable for the intentional design and conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests that result
in severe, widespread, or long-lasting damage to critical infrastructures? Would North Korea be
financially vulnerable, for example, to consortium-financed owners of submarine fiber optic
cable systems deployed throughout the Pacific Rim region? Or to investors in financial products
or markets that collapse in the absence of reliable intercontinental telecommunications?
A Canadian case provides insight as to the standards for financial liability, applying common law
principles. A fishing vessel master, with nets tangled via a submarine fiber optic cable line,
willfully cut the cable to recover his nets. A Canadian court determined that the damage was
intentional and the harm foreseeable. As a consequence, the court determined that the 1976
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims and its 1996 Protocol should not limit
the scope of financial damages for which the Ship Master and vessel owner should be
responsible. In the Telus case, the Court determined to waive the $500,000 damage limit
because “the loss was committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with the
knowledge that such loss would probably result.”28
While North Korea might, theoretically, be liable for massive financial damages through the
willful or reckless damage to submarine cable networks resulting from high-altitude EMP
testing, in practical terms North Korea may be nearly judgment-proof. Consider the broad
scope of sanctions already in force, through the unanimous decision of the United Nations
Security Council via Security Council Resolution 2375 (September 2017). a
Altogether, the political and legal regime governing atmospheric nuclear testing is unfavorable
for nations seeking to engage in atmospheric nuclear testing. Since North Korea is already in
many respects a pariah state with limited financial resources, the legal regime may be
insufficient to deter atmospheric nuclear testing if the demonstration of capability is seen as a
sufficient prize by North Korea and other test sponsors.
Might more prosperous nation states that have aided and abetted North Korea’s development
of ballistic missiles, indigenous rocket fuel production, fissionable materials for nuclear
weapons, and other weapons technologies be determined to be financially responsible for third

a

See the Treaty Documents and UN Resolutions section of this paper for a click-through hyperlink to the text of
this resolution.
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party loss of life and infrastructure damage? A substantial and growing literature on
“complicity” in international law may ultimately result in financial liability for intentional
violation of export controls and sanctions regimes.29 However, nations that merely train or
financially aid other nations may not be determined to be legally responsible for the tortious
acts of other nations.30

Technical Considerations for and against High-Altitude EMP Tests
While an EMP attack would cover a much wider area than a ground-level blast and shock
attack, and an EMP attack would likely have a more pervasive impact on critical infrastructure,
this means of attack has been far less tested. To date, there have been approximately 2,500
nuclear tests worldwide, including approximately 500 in the atmosphere. The United States
conducted 1,054 nuclear tests, including 216 aboveground. Of the aboveground U.S. tests, less
than a dozen have been at high enough altitudes to generate significant EMP effects. Tests
included Operation Hardtack I in 1958 (Yucca, Teak, and Orange shots); three shots during
Operation Argus in 1958-59; and Operation Dominic in 1962 (Fishbowl Series including Starfish
Prime, Checkmate, Bluegill, and Kingfish). The U.S. tests were inadequately instrumented for
EMP measurement, because the severity of high-altitude EMP effects was unanticipated due to
incomplete theory that underestimated electromagnetic field strengths. Most of the data
collected remains classified. Publicly available data on the handful of USSR high-altitude tests is
likewise sparse.
In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty took effect, bringing U.S. and USSR atmospheric tests to an
end. Moreover, even if the U.S. and Soviet atmospheric tests had been better instrumented in
the early 1960s, they could not have provided high confidence in assessing vulnerability,
operability, and recovery of 21st century critical infrastructures in the present era of ubiquitous
use of miniaturized electronics, digital communications and control circuitry, and the Internet.
A high-altitude EMP test might be viewed as an act of war, or at minimum a material breach of
the ENMOD of 1977. Nonetheless, North Korea could have high strategic payoff to developing a
better understanding of optimal techniques for EMP attack. (Various EMP attack parameters
include altitude, latitude, time of day, location to maximize critical infrastructure damage, etc.).
And an important step in enhancing a nuclear EMP deterrent would be demonstrating to
adversaries that EMP attack could have wide-area effects on modern critical infrastructures and
the global economy.
North Korea also has disincentives for a high-altitude EMP test. Their EMP test may turn out to
be executed at a non-optimal altitude and location, producing minimal effects. Alternatively, an
EMP test might damage critical infrastructure of multiple countries—especially, the widespread
networks of undersea telecom cables and landing stations in the Pacific region.31 After an EMP
test, depending upon the altitude of detonation, a large fraction of satellites in medium and
low-earth orbit could fail from radiation exposure. An EMP test with resulting damage to
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telecommunications and satellite infrastructure may profoundly harm the economy of China,
North Korea’s critical trading partner.
An EMP test that had foreseeable effects upon military facilities or critical infrastructures in U.S.
territories, or within a U.S. allied nation, might be deemed to be an attack on the United States,
thereby authorizing individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Hence, a North Korean EMP test might invite a nuclear response, or in the alternative,
execution of “anticipatory defense” actions targeting of North Korean military strike capabilities
with conventional forces.32 Non-military response to an EMP test may include further trade,
travel, transportation interdiction, and other sanctions consistent with the United Nations
Security Council sanctions unanimously approved in September 2017.a

Potential North Korean Test of Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
For use as a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), a satellite with a nuclear device
onboard is launched into low earth orbit, where it can remain ready for attack commands for
hours, days, months, or years. Shortly preceding the time of attack, the orbital velocity of the
satellite is decreased with thrusters, causing the satellite to de-orbit and reach the desired
altitude and location for nuclear device detonation. There is the possibility that North Korea
could use the FOBS technique for an atmospheric nuclear test.
The United States has been vulnerable to FOBS attacks coming toward its southern border—
especially as a satellite approaches U.S. territory in its first orbit. However, as U.S. ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems have improved, their inherent capability to counter FOBS attack
has increased.
The U.S. might counter any North Korean test using the FOBS technique. In addition to several
U.S. and Japanese Aegis BMD destroyers and cruisers in the vicinity of North Korea, the United
States deployed in October 2017 three aircraft carrier strike groups, including their associated
cruisers and destroyers. Thus, there are several BMD ships that could shoot down such satellite
launches, depending on the satellite launch site, the BMD ship locations and the crew training,
and preparations and intercept authorization to engage in a timely way.b

a

See the Treaty Documents and UN Resolutions section of this paper for a click-through hyperlink to the text of
this resolution.
b
The U.S. capability to shoot down satellites was demonstrated in 2008, when the USS Lake Erie shot down a dying
satellite above the atmosphere. See the U.S. Navy’s mission video at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDqNjnUNUl8 and the lengthy Wikipedia description
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Burnt_Frost Operation Burnt Frost was a major feat, given the then
embryonic state of U.S. sensor tracking systems. Today, 35 Aegis BMD ships of the U.S. Navy have improved
intercept capabilities and substantially improved tracking capabilities. These capabilities could also provide data
for the U.S. ground-based homeland BMD system, especially at Vandenberg AFB in California. Also, the THAAD site
in South Korea has a TPY-2 X-Band radar which will improve tracking capability. A remaining issue is whether the
crews are trained and ready—and whether they are authorized to engage in a timely way.
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Previous North Korean Missile and Satellite Launches
Since May 2017, North Korea has conducted five intermediate range and intercontinental
ballistic missile tests that show capability for atmospheric tests over the Pacific Ocean.33 34 35
The locations and altitudes of these tests inform possible scenarios for future North Korean
tests:
May 14, 2017: North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 missile from a site near Kusong into
the Sea of Japan. Distance covered was 700 kilometers in 30 minutes, maximum altitude
was 2,000 kilometers. Had the trajectory been shallower, the missile range would have
been 4,500 kilometers, potentially reaching the U.S. territory of Guam in the Pacific.
July 3, 2017: North Korea launched a Hwasong-14 missile from the Panghyon Aircraft
Factory into the Sea of Japan. Distance covered was 930 kilometers in 37 minutes,
maximum altitude was 2,802 kilometers. Had the trajectory been shallower, the missile
range would have been 6,700 kilometers, potentially reaching Alaska or Hawaii.
July 28, 2017: North Korea launched a Hwasong-14 missile from the Chagang Province
into the Sea of Japan. Distance covered was 1,000 kilometers in 45 minutes, maximum
altitude was 3,700 kilometers. Had the trajectory been shallower, the missile range
would have been around 10,000 kilometers, potentially reaching Los Angeles, Denver, or
Chicago.
August 27, 2017: North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 missile from Sunan launch site,
near Pyongyang International Airport, transiting over the Japanese island of Hokkaido
and into the Pacific Ocean. Distance covered was 2,700 kilometers in 15 minutes,
maximum altitude was 550 kilometers. At a more optimal trajectory, the range might
have been 4,800 kilometers.
September 14, 2017: North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 missile from a site near the
Pyongyang airport, transiting over the Japanese island of Hokkaido and into the Pacific
Ocean. Distance covered was 3,700 kilometers in 17 minutes, maximum altitude was
770 kilometers. This was the longest range North Korean missile test to date.
North Korea has successfully launched two satellites into polar orbits.36 The rockets and
trajectories used for these launches could also be used for atmospheric tests and
demonstration of the fractional orbital bombardment technique:
December 12, 2012: North Korea launched a satellite on an Unha-3 rocket from the
Sohae Space Centre in North Phyongan Province southward into a polar orbit. The
launch path passed over the Philippine Sea, east of the island of Luzon.
February 6, 2016: North Korea launched a satellite on an Unha-3 rocket along
approximately the same trajectory as the December 2012 launch.
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Recent North Korean Missile and Satellite Launch Trajectories

Figure 3. Approximate Trajectories of Recent North Korean Missile and Satellite Tests
Recent North Korean long-range missile tests have flown eastward trajectories, landing in the Sea of Japan on lofted trajectories or
overflying the less densely populated Japanese island of Hokkaido. Trajectories for launches of North Korean satellites have
overflown the Philippine Sea east of the island of Taiwan, narrowly avoiding the densely populated Philippine island of Luzon. The
eastward and southern trajectories may be likely paths for missiles used for future North Korean atmospheric tests.
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High-Yield Underground Bomb Test
At 03:30 UTC on September 3, 2017 North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test at the
Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility. Yield estimates ranged from 60 kilotons to in excess of 300
kilotons.37 This range of yields would be consistent with a small hydrogen bomb or a boosted
yield fission device. Either design can produce optimized EMP effects.

High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Environments
The 1962 Starfish Prime test demonstrated that a nuclear weapon detonated in the upper
atmosphere will produce a series of electromagnetic pulses radiating downward within line-ofsight (LOS) of the blast, termed high-altitude EMP or “HEMP” effects.

Figure 4. Types of HEMP; Notional Waveform38
•

•
•

The E1 “early time” pulse has a high amplitude of thousands of volts per meter, with the
peak lasting about 200 nanoseconds. The E1 pulse induces high voltages in conductors
of approximately 0.3 meters of length or more; these conductors act like radio
antennas. When electronic equipment is exposed to E1 pulse voltages, transistor
junctions can change polarity or break down, causing temporary upset or permanent
damage. Also, E1 voltages can cause arcing and damage of large power transformers
used for high-voltage electricity transmission.
The E2 “intermediate time” pulse is similar to nearby lighting strikes. Ground-based
equipment protected against lightning is similarly protected against E2.
The E3 “late-time” pulses, also termed magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) pulses, are low
frequency waves lasting tens of seconds. The E3 pulse, as illustrated above, has two
components that occur in sequence. The E3A pulse is caused by distortion of the Earth’s
17
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magnetic field caused by the expanding fireball. The E3B pulse, or “heave” effect, is
caused by rising plasmas in the ionosphere. Both E3A and E3B can induce dozens of
volts per kilometer in long conductors such as high voltage transmission lines and
undersea communication cables; resulting currents in long power and communication
lines can reach 1,000 amperes.

E1 Pulse
The E1 pulse is produced by nuclear detonations at altitudes ranging from 40 kilometers to 400
kilometers. The peak E1 fields are only weakly dependent on weapon yield. A factor of one
thousand change in yield results in a factor of four change in peak field. It is a misconception
that only high-yield devices can produce damaging E1 electric fields.

Peak E1 Electric Field on Ground in Volts/Meter
Figure 5. Illustration of Peak E1 Field on Ground by Detonation Altitude and Device Yield 39
For a 300 kiloton yield device, at the upper end of yield estimates for the September 3, 2017
North Korean underground test, the peak E1 field max could be in the range of 20,000
volts/meter at a detonation altitude of 40 kilometers. At a detonation altitude of 400
kilometers, the peak E1 field could likewise be approximately 20,000 volts/meter. At an
18
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intermediate altitude of 80 kilometers, a slightly higher peak E1 field of approximately 25,000
volts/meter could be produced. Bomb designs that more efficiently produce gamma radiation
may produce higher amplitude electric fields.

E3A Pulse
The E3A pulse can be produced by nuclear detonations at altitudes starting at 200 kilometers.
The peak value of the E3A pulse scales nearly linearly with bomb yield over a wide range of
yields from 10 kilotons to 1 megaton.40

Figure 6. Burst Height and Atmosphere Scaling for Peak E3A Electric Field41
The E3A pulse amplitude peaks at detonation altitude of approximately 400 kilometers in a low
density atmosphere. The amplitude of the E3A electric field is greatly affected by the density of
the atmosphere, with a “high density” atmosphere reducing the signal by a factor of 20 or
more. “Low density” refers to nighttime at the minimum of the solar cycle, “medium density”
refers to daytime at solar minimum or nighttime at solar maximum and “high density” refers to
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daytime at solar maximum. In year 2017, the sun is nearing the minimum of the 11 year solar
cycle.

E3B Pulse
The amplitude of the E3B pulse rapidly increases after a detonation altitude of 100 kilometers,
peaking at a detonation altitude of approximately 140 kilometers and then diminishing by an
order of magnitude at 400 kilometers.

Figure 7. Burst height scaling for Peak E3B electric field42
It is notable that the E3A and E3B electric fields have significantly different peak amplitudes as a
function of altitude—400 kilometers and 140 kilometers, respectively.43 44Therefore, it is
impossible to maximize both E3A and E3B effects with a single detonation.
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High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Effects
Land-Based Critical Infrastructure
The E1 pulse will impact land-based electrical infrastructure connected to conductors of
approximately 0.3 meters length or more, such as antennas, coaxial cables, twisted pair
conductors, power cords, Ethernet patch cords, etc. Particularly affected will be any connected
equipment with integrated circuits, such as computers, internet routers, and industrial control
systems. Self-contained devices with no connected cords, such as handheld cell phones, are less
likely to be impacted.
The E3 pulse will impact land-based electrical infrastructure connected to long conductors
running several kilometers or more. Induced currents of up to 1,000 amperes can cause
overload and premature failure. Examples of vulnerable equipment include power transformers
at the ends of high voltage transmission lines, line driver cards at the ends of long metallic
communication landlines, and repeaters necessary for the operation of long fiber optic lines.

Undersea Cables
The E3 pulse penetrates deep into ocean waters and has the potential to impact undersea
telecommunications cables. 45 While modern undersea cables transmit their signals using nonconductive fiber optics, repeaters are required approximately every 100 kilometers to boost the
optical signal. Currents induced in the repeater power leads from the E3 pulse can be in the
thousands of amps46; if the circuitry is not protected, overload and immediate burnout can
occur.
The E1 pulses will not affect submarine cables, but may damage electronic components within
aboveground unprotected cable landing sites.47

Aircraft
During high-altitude nuclear tests Kingfish (95 kilometers altitude), Bluegill (48 kilometers
altitude), and Checkmate (147 kilometers altitude), instrumentation aircraft experienced
electronic upsets, proving that the E1 pulse from EMP can impact airplanes. (All aircraft were
able to land safely). The aluminum enclosures of aircraft provide limited shielding as partial
Faraday cages. Today’s avionics are commonly shielded against electromagnetic interference
from lightning, radios, radars, passenger cell phones, etc. Nonetheless, because of widespread
adoption of digital “fly by wire” controls, modern aircraft are vastly more dependent on
electronic circuits than military aircraft used during the 1960’s Operation Fishbowl tests.48
Without placing commercial airframes in EMP test trestles, it is not possible to rule out the
possibility that EMP can “cause airplanes to fall from the sky.”

Satellites
Due to x-rays released by low-yield nuclear detonations above the stratosphere, unhardened
commercial satellites within 1,000 kilometers of the burst will suffer immediate damage to their
semiconductor-based circuits. For a burst at 120 kilometers, about 10% of LEO satellites will fail
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from direct radiation exposure. In addition, long-term damage to satellites will result from the
injection of ionizing radiation into the Van Allen belts. The Van Allen belts trap free electrons
that can persist in orbit for years, colliding with satellites. This lingering “trapped electron”
effect dramatically reduces the operational life of satellites, sometimes to just weeks. The free
electron issue is most acute for satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)—160 kilometers altitude to
2,000 kilometers. After the 1962 Starfish Prime EMP test, one-third of all satellites in LEO failed
due to cumulative radiation effects.49
While many military satellites are now hardened against nuclear radiation, commercial
satellites generally are not. Applications for commercial and military satellites in LEO include
earth observation and spy satellites, satellite phones (Iridium and GlobalStar), and broadband
digital communications (Teledesic). A high-altitude EMP test will cause extensive damage to
LEO satellites.

Humans
Direct and immediate impacts of EMP on humans are likely to be minimal. For people directly
gazing skyward at the fireball, temporary blindness or even permanent retinal damage may
occur, depending on distance, detonation altitude, and meteorological conditions.50 EMP would
cause no blast and shock effects at ground level. Likewise, immediate radiation at ground level
would be minimal. However, nuclear debris from EMP detonations above the troposphere
would descend over a period of months to years and be carried around the earth by winds in
the stratosphere.

Duties to Notify Airmen and Mariners
Under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which entered into force on April
4, 1947 and to which North Korea is a party, nations that anticipate a hazard to civil aviation
have an obligation to provide Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) of an impending test or closure
area. Pursuant to the law of the sea, coastal states are obligated to provide comparable Notices
to Mariners (NOTMARs). Failure to provide timely and reliable notice in advance of missile or
nuclear weapons tests increases risks to public safety and public health, including risks of retinal
burns and potential blindness, and radioactive debris contamination. North Korea has not
reliably issued NOTAMs or NOTMARs for past tests. To conduct an atmospheric nuclear test
without appropriate advance warnings would be wrongful under international law, and a
needless harm. North Korea, acting as a pariah state, has not reliably provided advance notices
to the International Civil Aviation Organization or to aircraft operators in its vicinity.51 These
failures to provide warning of test hazards suggest that in the design of test monitoring
capabilities, the United States and its allies should not depend upon mandatory notices as “tip
offs” to prepare for test monitoring.
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Atmospheric Test Scenarios
Taking into account demonstrated North Korean missile capabilities and past trajectories,
statements and threats by North Korea, and potential impacts on critical infrastructure and
human population, we constructed five potential North Korean atmospheric test scenarios.
Each test scenario has three basic characteristics:
1. Path and terminus of trajectory: following previously observed missile trajectories or
not, over ocean only, over landmasses and populations other than North Korea’s, etc.
2. Purpose of the scenario: demonstration of integration of missile and warhead, reentry
capability, E1 effects, E3 effects, impacts on critical infrastructures, etc.
3. Altitude of detonation.
Importantly, we believe that all five postulated test scenarios are within current North Korean
technical capabilities. These scenarios consider live tests of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear
warheads. Because of risks associated with fuzing malfunction, launch failure, and guidance
errors, nations have rarely tested nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles. However, if
North Korea were to conduct an atmospheric test in the Pacific, we believe delivery via an
armed missile is most probable given the risks of localized fallout from a surface burst in nearby
waters and also the risk of interception of any naval vessel or aircraft used as a delivery
mechanism.
We present the atmospheric test scenarios in rough order of risk and level of provocation. For
example, a “North Pacific” test over the ocean at 20 kilometer altitude will not produce
appreciable EMP effects or harm satellites, but will demonstrate miniaturization and capability
for high-altitude fuzing of a missile and warhead system. In contrast, a 150 kilometer altitude
test slightly north of Guam could demonstrate both E1 and E3 impacts on critical infrastructure,
including debilitation of undersea telecommunications cables and large numbers of satellites.
Our five test scenarios are illustrative, but not exhaustive. We believe our scenarios are more
likely than others because they minimize the risk of international sanctions by limiting collateral
damage or, alternatively, demonstrating E1 and E3 effects on less infrastructure. Nonetheless,
because of the very few pathways for missile trajectories that avoid overflight of human
populations, the extensive network of undersea telecom cables in the Pacific,52 a EMP effects on
LEO satellites regardless of test location, and the potential for globally distributed fallout, there
are no safe scenarios for atmospheric EMP tests by North Korea.

a

Paths of undersea cables in the following scenario illustrations are indicative of general location and path, and
should not be interpreted as precise locations.
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Scenario 1: North Pacific

Scenario 1, “North Pacific,” could demonstrate the capability to deliver and detonate a warhead mounted on an ICBM. The
trajectory could roughly follow the path of the September 15, 2017 launch, passing over the southern tip of less densely populated
Japanese island of Hokkaido and terminating in an empty area of the Pacific Ocean. The 20 kilometers detonation altitude would not
produce ground-level blast and shock effects or appreciable EMP effects. Because the detonation would be at low-altitude, satellites
would be shielded from radiation effects by the intervening atmosphere. Nearby aircraft may be at risk from blast. At a detonation
altitude of 20 kilometers, no debris from the earth’s surface would be irradiated and lofted, so local fallout would be minimal.
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Scenario 2: Philippine Sea

Scenario 2, “Philippine Sea,” could have the purpose of demonstrating integrated missile and warhead capability while avoiding
overflight of populated areas. The trajectory of the missile would roughly follow the paths of North Korea’s December 12, 2012 and
February 7, 2016 satellite launches, but would descend toward the Philippine Sea, east of Taiwan, instead of achieving orbit. The 20
kilometer burst altitude should be high enough to avoid radiation exposure and hearing loss for mariners in heavily transited sea
lanes. Retinal burns are possible if the burst is directly in the field of view. There would be no EMP effects. Nearby airplanes may be
at risk from blast. Were a missile guidance system error to occur, the population of Taiwan could be at risk.
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Scenario 3: South Pacific

Scenario 3, “South Pacific,” could demonstrate both E1 and E3 EMP effects. The missile’s path would take it over the Japanese
islands, terminating in a vast and mostly unpopulated expanse of the South Pacific. The 400 kilometers burst altitude would produce
both E1 and E3 effects. This region of the Pacific Ocean, including French Polynesia, is subject to the Treaty of Rarotonga, an in-force
treaty banning atmospheric nuclear testing. To avoid E1 effects on the most populous areas of French Polynesia, the detonation
altitude therefore might be adjusted downward. Areas of French Polynesia closer to and south of the center detonation point, such
as Nuku Hiva, would be well-situated for EMP observation and instrumentation.
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Scenario 4: Johnston Island

Scenario 4, “Johnston Island,” could have the purpose of demonstrating both E1 and E3 EMP effects. The missile trajectory would
pass over the northern tip of the Japan’s Honshu Island and terminate 150 kilometers above Johnston Island, identical to the latitude
and longitude location of the 1962 Starfish Prime test―for potential symbolic effect. A 150 kilometer altitude detonation would
produce both E1 and E3 effects. Electrical equipment in the Hawaiian Islands would be impacted by the edge of the EMP field
footprint. The E3 pulse might impact electric transmission lines on the big island of Hawaii. Undersea telecom cables running west
and south from Hawaii would likely be affected. To avoid E1 impact on Hawaii’s infrastructure, the detonation altitude could be
reduced.
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Scenario 5: Guam

Scenario 5, “Guam,” could have the purpose of demonstrating EMP effects on critical infrastructure of the U.S. and its Asian allies.
The potential missile trajectory would transit over Japan and terminate in international waters about 35 kilometers to the north of
Guam, consistent with August 10, 2017 threat by North Korea to “hit the waters 30 to 40 kilometers away from Guam.”53 Detonation
at 150 kilometers altitude would produce both E1 and E3 effects, affecting electrical equipment on U.S. military bases and undersea
telecom cables transiting the island. Alternative detonation at 40 kilometers altitude would produce only E1 effects and suppress
effects on satellites. Such EMP detonations could be judged as acts of war, compelling Article 51 retaliation against North Korea.
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Measurement of E1 and E3 Effects
Because of inadequate theoretical understanding of EMP at the time, the 1962 Starfish Prime
test was inadequately instrumented, with recorded waveforms going “off-scale” (EMP signal
strength was much higher than instrument settings). While the physics of nuclear EMP are now
well-understood, there has been much active debate on the magnitude of EMP effects on
critical infrastructure, especially with a paucity of data in the unclassified realm. Proactive
instrumentation of EMP effects during North Korean atmospheric tests, as well as post
mortems on infrastructure failures, have the potential to inform protective measures.

Recording Devices
The E1 pulse can be instrumented by commonly available digital recording oscilloscopes
operating in the gigahertz range coupled to Baum electric and magnetic field sensors. If
scientific instrumentation is unavailable, a simple whip antenna will suffice to get rough
measurement of EMP field levels. Unfortunately, the internal circuitry of digital oscilloscopes
may not survive exposure to the E1 pulse, so it is prudent to enclose the scopes in a Faraday
cage and use internal battery power. A readily available but less capable alternative is a
commercially produced recording device, EMP.Alert™ from Emprimus. This shielded device
measures E1 fields and digitally records only peak values on internal data storage.
The E3 pulse can be directly observed by commercially available magnetometers, such as those
used by the United States Geological Service. Because the internal circuitry of the
magnetometer may not survive exposure to the E1 pulse, a Faraday cage enclosure will be
prudent, with internal battery power.
The E3 pulse can also be derived by measuring induced voltages on long conductors. There is
commercially available equipment to monitor Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC) in the
neutral leads of transformers, for example, ECLIPSE™ from Advanced Power Technologies.
At landing stations of undersea telecommunications cables, the power feed equipment (PFE)
output lead would be another appropriate point to measure the E3-induced current. Care
should be taken that existing instrumentation does not go “off-scale” as the induced voltage
could be up to tens of volts/kilometer—or many thousands of volts integrated over the length
of a long undersea cable.

Instrumentation Locations
Our three EMP test scenarios—South Pacific, Johnston Island, and Guam—illustrate the
potential for instrumentation of EMP effects. Of course, a North Korean EMP test may be in
other locations as well. We suggest the following Pacific Region locations as illustrative of a
range of possible monitoring sites:
1. Guam
2. Hawaii
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3. Johnston Island
4. Wake Island
5. Midway Island
6. Northern Mariana Islands
7. Rose Atoll
8. Attu Station in the Aleutian Islands
9. Adak Island in the Aleutians
10. Fort Greely, Alaska
11. French Polynesia
12. Pitcairn Island
A network of EMP instrumentation locations could be of similar value to the global array of
seismographs that provide intelligence on North Korean underground nuclear tests.

Conclusions
There are no low-risk or impact-free trajectories, altitudes, and locations for North Korea to
conduct atmospheric tests in the Pacific, including EMP tests, as our analysis shows:
•
•

•

•

•

“North Pacific,” the trajectory of past missile tests, sends a plutonium warhead over the
Japanese island of Hokkaido. Aircraft near the detonation might be affected by blast.
“Philippine Sea,” the only trajectory that avoids sending a plutonium warhead over
inhabited landmasses, follows a narrow corridor between South Korea to the east and
the island of Taiwan to the west. Errors in missile guidance or fuze operation could be
catastrophic for populations along the flight path.
“South Pacific,” a trajectory for an EMP test that terminates in a vast expanse of empty
ocean, sends a plutonium warhead over Japan. Moreover, an error in missile guidance
or fuzing could cause a detonation near Hawaii.
EMP tests near Hawaii or Guam are likely to have significant impact on critical
infrastructure and undersea communications cables. EMP tests near U.S. territory could
be viewed as acts of war.
Regardless of location, a high-altitude EMP test is likely to cause nuclear effects for large
regions of the earth, debilitating satellite networks, international telecommunications,
cloud data storage, and financial transactions—resulting in global economic impact and,
possibly, worldwide catastrophe.
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Policy Recommendations for the U.S. Government
We make the following policy recommendations for the U.S. Government:
1. A North Korean atmospheric test of a nuclear warhead in the Pacific would be a risky
and provocative act. Through diplomatic channels and otherwise, the North Korean
regime should be warned that there are no “low-risk” or “low-impact” test options.
2. It would be technically challenging for North Korea to conduct a test of wide-area
EMP effects without impacting satellites and the extensive network of undersea
telecommunication cables in the Pacific. Because submarine fiber optic cable
networks are ubiquitous and provide approximately 98% of all international voice,
data, video, and internet traffic,54 the concurrent loss of a significant share of the
world’s roughly 400 submarine fiber optic cables, which enable at least $10 trillion
dollars of global transactions each day, would be likely to cause a global recession or
severe depression harmful to every nation on the planet. American trading partners
in the Pacific, including China, should be alerted that some North Korean test
scenarios could interrupt undersea telecommunications necessary for financial
transactions, international trade, logistical control of global supply chains, and
China’s ability to reliably import the agricultural and energy commodities upon
which its economy depends.
3. Because the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 halted atmospheric tests and scientific
observation of EMP events, any test of EMP effects by North Korea will be a rare
opportunity to gather more data on these important phenomena and their impact
on modern infrastructure. United States and allied deployment of instrumentation
of E1 and E3 EMP effects in the Pacific region could have high strategic value. Any
attempts by North Korea or other adversaries to establish EMP instrumentation in
the Pacific region should be closely monitored.
4. Anticipating that no financial recovery will be available to reconstitute critical
infrastructures that may be damaged by high-altitude North Korean EMP testing, the
United States and its allies (and possibly quasi-allies such as China), should redouble
their efforts to discourage North Korean atmospheric nuclear testing before testing
occurs.
5. Because some North Korean atmospheric nuclear test scenarios may effectuate an
act of war, constitute a material breach of the ENMOD Convention, and/or cause
severe harm to other nations, the United States and its allies (and possibly quasiallies) should be prepared to execute “anticipatory self-defense” measures as may
be essential and time-urgent.
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Treaty Documents and UN Resolutions
1. United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. “Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water.” Treaty. United Nations, May 8, 1963.
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801313d9
2. General Assembly of the United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).” Treaty. United
Nations, October 5, 1978. https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4783.htm
3. Australia and 13 other signatories. “South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.” Treaty. United
Nations, December 11, 1986. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/rarotonga
4. United Nations Security Council. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375 (2017)”
Resolution. United Nations, September 11, 2017. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2375(2017)
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